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Abstract—Machine learning systems based on deep neural
networks (DNNs) produce state-of-the-art results in many
applications. Considering the large amount of training data
and know-how required to generate the network, it is more
practical to use third-party DNN intellectual property (IP)
cores for many designs. No doubt to say, it is essential for
DNN IP vendors to provide test cases for functional validation
without leaking their parameters to IP users. To satisfy this
requirement, we propose to effectively generate test cases that
activate parameters as many as possible and propagate their
perturbations to outputs. Then the functionality of DNN IPs
can be validated by only checking their outputs. However, it is
difficult considering large numbers of parameters and highly
non-linearity of DNNs. In this paper, we tackle this problem by
judiciously selecting samples from the DNN training set and
applying a gradient-based method to generate new test cases.
Experimental results demonstrate the efficacy of our proposed
solution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Artificial intelligence (AI) systems based on deep neural
networks (DNNs) have achieved great success in many areas
such as computer vision, speech recognition and natural lan-
guage processing. Over the years, neural networks become
increasingly larger and deeper, which requires significant
amount of data and time to train. For example, it may take
weeks to train a state-of-the-art model with the latest GPUs
on the ImageNet dataset [1]. Consequently, it is more practi-
cal for individual users or small firms to use a trained DNN
intellectual property (IP) (e.g., face recognition module) that
is commercially available. In most cases, vendors would
prefer a blackbox IP model to protect the architecture and
the trained parameters of the DNN.
DNNs, however, are susceptible to various kinds of at-
tacks. Adversarial example attacks [2]–[4] target to change
the outputs of DNNs by slightly perturbing their inputs.
Recently, there is an increasing number of attacks that target
at DNNs themselves instead of their input data. Liu et
al. [5] first proposes to attack DNN parameters for mis-
classifications based on two fault injection methods: single
bias attack and gradient descent attack. Reverse-engineering
attacks [6], [7] on hardware DNN accelerators can identify
the model parameters in the off-chip memory and then
attackers may stealthily substitute original parameters with
malicious ones. These attacks seriously threat safety-critical
applications based on DNNs. Therefore, it is essential for IP
users to validate the functionality of DNNs before everyday
usage.
Traditional integrity checking methods [8], [9] based
on generating signatures are not applicable for DNN IPs,
because IP users can not directly get the model parameters
for signature generation. Hardware testing techniques for
troubleshooting design defects [10], [11] are not applicable
either, as IP users have no access to intermediate results of
DNNs. To tackle the above problem, in this work, we pro-
pose a practical validation scheme for IP users considering
their limited black-box access. The idea is for IP vendors
to generate functional tests to activate parameters in the
DNN whose perturbations will propagate to the outputs.
Then, malicious perturbations of model parameters can be
directly detected by IP users, just checking the outputs of
the functional tests.
However, DNNs are highly generalized models and use
non-linear activation functions, only partial parameters will
be activated and take effect in the calculation for an input
sample [12], thus one functional test can only validate part of
parameters. Considering the large number of parameters in
today’s DNNs, it is challenging to generate a reasonable size
of functional tests to achieve a high validation coverage. In
this paper, we solve this problem with two techniques: first,
we judiciously select test cases from the existing training set,
and when this method becomes inefficient, a novel gradient-
based technique is presented to generate new test cases.
Experimental results show that the proposed functional test
generation method is effective and efficient, achieving a
high validation coverage with limited test cases, under both
malicious and random perturbations of DNN parameters.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work for
functional validation of DNN IPs considering end users
black-box access. The main contributions of this work
include:
• We formulate the functional validation of DNN IPs as
an optimization problem, wherein we try to generate a
small number of test cases that can activate as many
parameters as possible.
• We propose to judiciously select functional tests from
the training set in an iterative manner to efficiently
activate DNN parameters.
• We present to generate new functional tests with a novel
gradient-based method when selecting from the training
set is inefficient.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we give a preliminary introduction about neural networks
and the related work. Then we give an overview of our
functional test generation scheme in Section III. Next, the
proposed efficient functional test generation method is in-
troduced in Section IV. Finally, we present the experimental
results and conclude our work in Section V and Section VI,
respectively.
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II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Neural Networks
Neural networks are organized as successive layers of
neurons which are connected by links with different param-
eters. Each neuron in the hidden layer applies a non-linear
activation function on the weighted sum of its input. The
output of layer l + 1 is denoted as:
o(l+1) = σ(W (l)o(l) + b(l)), (1)
where σ is the activation function. o(l), W (l) and b(l) are
the outputs, weights and bias of the l-th layer, respectively.
Weights and bias are called parameters of the network. In
this way, the outputs of the current layer are computed by
a non-linear function applied on the outputs of the previous
layer and its parameters. Usually, there are many layers
in DNNs to achieve high generality. Therefore, DNN as a
whole is a complex non-linear function of parameters and
the input.
Activation functions provide non-linearity so that neural
networks can approximate arbitrary functions. There are
several activation functions in modern neural networks, such
as ReLU and Tanh, which both have some regions of
saturation or inactivation [13], [14]. For example, the output
of ReLU will always be zero as long as its input is negative.
As neural networks are trained to fit the large training set
where the training samples vary a lot to each other, an input
sample can only activate partial parameters in a well trained
model [12].
B. Related Work and Motivation
Past work has introduced several ways to inject faults
into DNNs themselves for compromising their functionality.
In [5], attackers fool DNNs to make mistakes by modifying
their parameters through fault injection, in which single
bias attack modifies one parameter with a large perturbation
for misclassification and gradient descent attack considers
stealthiness by adding small perturbations on a number
of parameters. Reverse-engineering attacks [6] can identify
model parameters in the off-chip memory, which may be
stealthily replaced by attackers. [15] performs practical laser
fault injection on activation functions of DNNs using a near-
infrared diode plus laser.
To the best of our knowledge, there exists few work
defending against the above functionality compromised at-
tacks for DNN IPs. Traditional signature-based integrity
checking methods [8], [9] are not applicable as IP users can
not access the DNN parameters. Testing techniques [10],
[11], [16], [17] generate test cases to cover all neurons so
that design defects of hardware DNNs can be detected and
located. However, they are not appropriate for functional
validation of DNN IPs under attacks for two reasons: first,
IP users have no access to the intermediate model results
as system testers do. Second, testing only considers the
neuron coverage, which is not enough for covering model
parameters under malicious attacks. For example, there are
two neurons in adjacent layers that are covered by two
separate test cases and no other tests cover them during
the testing process. Even though the two neurons can be
tested, the attacks targeting to perturb the weight between
them cannot be detected. As the two neurons are never
activated at the same time with test cases, the malicious
perturbations on the weight will never be revealed, but it
may cause misclassifications for other inputs.
Motivated by the above, in this paper, we propose to
validate the functionality of DNN IPs by effectively gen-
erating a small number of test cases that can activate
model parameters whenever possible and propagate their
perturbations to the outputs. IP users only have to run these
test cases and check the final outputs of DNNs to validate
their functionality without knowing model details. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first work of functional
validation for DNN IPs under malicious attacks targeting at
model parameters, as detailed in the following sections.
III. DNN IPS VALIDATION METHODOLOGY
As discussed in previous sections, IP users can just use
the DNN IP as a black box: feed the IP with an input and
get the corresponding output. Based on this, we propose a
practical functional validation scheme for IP users, in which
IP vendors will first generate a small number of functional
tests and share them with IP users, then users validate the
functionality of the IP by checking whether it functions
correctly with the shared tests.
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Fig. 1: The overview of functional validation for DNN IPs.
The working flow of the proposed functional validation
scheme is shown in Fig. 1, which consists of two phases.
Firstly, for the IP vendors, they generate a small set of
functional tests X , then release these test cases, the cor-
responding outputs Y together with the IP to users. After
through an unsecure distribution process, IP users receive the
IP and run it as a black box with these functional tests X .
Then they compare the current outputs Y ′ with the provided
ones Y . If they are not identical, the DNN IP has been
perturbed. Otherwise, it is secure. The shared functional tests
X and the corresponding outputs Y are encrypted, thus their
integrity can be ensured.
As DNNs are extremely complex and non-linear, only
partial parameters take effect for one test case. The pertur-
bations of other parameters will not be detected and thus not
be validated with this test. Therefore, the key challenge in
our validation scheme is to effectively generate a reasonable
number of functional tests that can validate DNN parameters
as many as possible under malicious perturbations, which is
demonstrated in the next section.
IV. EFFICIENT FUNCTIONAL TEST GENERATION
In this section, we first define our validation objective.
Then we propose to judiciously select tests from the existing
training set and when this method becomes inefficient, a
new gradient-based test generation technique is presented.
Finally, these two approaches are combined in a unified way
to efficiently generate functional tests for DNN IPs.
A. Validation Objective
In our validation scheme, we call a parameter is activated
when perturbations of it will propagate to the DNN output
and be detected. Otherwise, it is un-activated. A parameter
can be validated when at least one test case activates it.
As the gradient of a function measures the sensitivity of its
output with respect to the change of its argument, we use the
gradient of the DNN output with respect to the parameter to
determine whether the parameter is activated or not. Assume
ReLU is the activation function, given an input x, we define
the parameter θi is activated if it satisfies:
∇θiF (x) 6= 0, (2)
where F is the function of the DNN. ∇θiF (x) calculates
the gradient of F (x) with respect to θi. Unlike ReLU, the
gradients of other activations (e.g., Sigmoid and Tanh) in the
saturation regions are quite small and approximate to zero.
In this case, we define θi is activated when ∇θiF (x) is
greater than a small value . For the easy explanation of our
method, we assume ReLU is the default activation function.
Therefore, the validation coverage of a functional test x
can be formulated as follows:
V C(x) =
#{θ | ∇θF (x) 6= 0}
#(θ)
, (3)
where the numerator is the number of activated parameters,
and the denominator is the number of total parameters in the
DNN. The validation coverage of a functional test equals to
the percentage of parameters it activates.
As one functional test can only activate partial parameters,
it is necessary to use a set of functional tests to achieve a
high validation coverage. Given a test set X with n samples,
its validation coverage is as follows:
V C(X) =
#(P1 ∪ P2 ∪ ...Pn)
#(θ)
, (4)
where
Pi = {θ | ∇θF (xi) 6= 0}. (5)
Pi denotes the parameter set activated by the test case xi,
and the validation coverage of X is the percentage of unique
parameters activated by all tests in X .
Generally speaking, more test cases can activate more
parameters and thus obtain a higher validation coverage, but
will incur a larger validation cost. Therefore, it is essential
to achieve a good tradeoff between the validation coverage
and cost. We formulate this problem as follows:
arg max
X
V C(X)
s.t. #(X) ≤ Nt,
(6)
where Nt is the maximum number of test cases allowed
for functional validation. Our objective is to maximize the
validation coverage with a limited number of test cases.
Next, we introduce techniques to solve this problem in detail.
B. Selecting from Training Set
The first solution we propose is to select functional
tests from the existing training set based on the following
heuristic: as the DNN is trained to successfully perform
some tasks (e.g., regression and classification) on the training
set, most parameters will participate in processing these
tasks. In other words, if many parameters are not activated
in the training set, the network is not trained well, as many
resources are wasted.
Based on the above analysis, we judiciously select test
cases from the training samples in an iterative manner.
In each iteration, we choose the sample that can activate
the maximal number of un-activated parameters. At the
beginning, the chosen validation set is empty, and the sample
with the highest validation coverage is firstly selected. Then
in the following iterations, we choose the next sample si
from the training set S according to the following equation:
arg max
si∈S
V C(X + si)− V C(X), (7)
where X is the current validation set that includes the chosen
samples in previous iterations. This equation selects the input
that can activate the most un-activated parameters or lead to
the largest validation coverage increase.
Algorithm 1: Selecting from training set.
Input: DNN function F , training set S, maximum functional
tests Nt.
Output: Validation set X .
1 Initialize validation set: X = ∅;
2 while #(X) < Nt do
3 for si ∈ S do
4 ∆siV C = V C(X + si)− V C(X);
5 end
6 Select si with the largest ∆siV C;
7 Add si to the validation set X;
8 Update V C(X).
9 end
The whole process of selecting functional tests from the
training set is shown in Algorithm 1, in which we first
initialize the validation set as empty. During each iteration,
we calculate the benefit or the increased validation coverage
∆siV C achieved for each training sample in line 3-5. Then
we select the best one which brings the largest validation
coverage increase, and add it to the validation set X in line
7. The iteration is continued until the number of functional
tests exceeds the limit Nt.
The experimental results in Section V show that this
method is effective at early iterations, achieving a high
validation coverage with a very small number of functional
tests. However, in late iterations, the validation coverage will
increase extremely slow with new functional tests added.
That is to say, the method will saturate quickly. To solve
this problem, next we propose to generate new samples to
activate the remaining parameters as many as possible when
training samples are no longer efficient.
C. Gradient-based Test Generation
Considering there are some parameters difficult to activate
by the training samples, we propose to generate new samples
to activate these bottleneck parameters. The key idea is to
generate synthetic training samples which can be classified
correctly by the network consists of the un-activated param-
eters. The intuition is that samples correctly classified by a
DNN will have similar features with its training samples,
thus can efficiently activate the network parameters. Based
on this, we propose to efficiently activate the bottleneck
parameters by generating synthetic training samples based
on the gradient descent technique widely used for training
DNNs.
Unlike training DNNs, wherein parameters are updated
to minimize the loss, we update the input to reduce the loss
according to the gradients of it. This can be formulated as
follows:
x∗i = xi − η∇xiJ(xi, yi, θ), (8)
where J(xi, yi, θ) is the loss function that measures the
gap between the model output for an input xi and the
corresponding ground truth yi. In each update, we change
the input with the step size η at the directions based on the
gradients of J(xi, yi, θ) with respect to xi, in which the
loss can decrease most quickly. After several iterations, we
can get the synthetic training samples that can be classified
correctly by the network with un-activated parameters.
In each iteration, we generate a batch of k synthetic
training samples where k is the number of the neurons in
the output layer. We do this because for classification, the
number of neurons in the output layer corresponds to the
number of classification categories. Each category has their
own unique features and a batch of input containing all these
categories will have a higher probability to activate more
parameters.
The overall process of gradient-based test generation is
shown in Algorithm 2, where in each iteration, we generate
k input patterns, classified as k different categories, respec-
tively. First, in line 3, the inputs are initialized with all zeros.
Then, we update these inputs using gradient descent method
to iteratively decrease the loss function J in line 5-11. After
T iterations, the generated k tests can be classified by the
model correctly and we add them to the validation set X
in line 12. The process is continued until the number of
generated functional tests reaches to the limit.
D. Combined Functional Test Generation
As Algorithm 1 is effective at early iterations but quickly
becomes inefficient, Algorithm 2 can continually increase
the validation coverage, but is not as efficient as Algorithm 1
Algorithm 2: Gradient-based test generation.
Input: Loss J , category number k, maximum functional tests
Nt, maximum gradient descent updates T .
Output: Validation set X .
1 Initialize validation set: X = ∅.
2 while #(X) < Nt do
3 Initialize x∗1, x∗2, ... , x∗k with all zeros;
4 t = 0;
5 while t < T do
6 for i← 1 to k do
7 δ = η∇x∗i J(x∗i , yi, θ);
8 x∗i = x
∗
i − δ;
9 end
10 t = t+ 1;
11 end
12 Add x∗1, x∗2, ... , x∗k to X .
13 end
in the early stage (the true training samples are more
effective than the synthetic ones). Therefore, we propose
to combine these two functional test generation techniques
in a unified way, where we generate tests with Algorithm 1
first, and then switch to Algorithm 2 when Algorithm 1 is
inefficient. However, the remained problem is to identify the
switch point. We propose to compare the benefit achieved by
each algorithm. When the increased validation coverage per
test case generated by Algorithm 2 is greater than the one
generated by Algorithm 1, we will transform to gradient-
based test generation method.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Experimental Setup
The experiments are performed with MNIST [18] and
CIFAR-10 [19] datasets. The MNIST includes 70000 hand-
written digit images, and the CIFAR-10 contains 60000
color images of natural objects. To verify that our valida-
tion scheme can apply to varying DNN architectures and
activation functions, we train the MNIST model with Tanh
activation function, and the CIFAR-10 model with ReLU.
For each dataset, we implement one DNN model, detailed
in Table I. The MNIST and CIFAR-10 models achieve
98.9% and 84.26% classification accuracy respectively,
which are comparable to the state-of-the-art results.
Layer MNIST CIFAR
1 28*28 Image 32*32 RGB Image
2 Conv(3,3,32). Tanh Conv(3,3,64). ReLU
3 Conv(3,3,32). Tanh Conv(3,3,64). ReLUMax pooling(2,2) Max pooling(2,2)
4 Conv(3,3,64). Tanh Conv(3,3,128). ReLU
5 Conv(3,3,64). Tanh Conv(3,3,128). ReLUMax pooling(2,2) Max pooling(2,2)
6 Fully connect 128. Tanh Fully connect 512. ReLU
7 Fully connect 10. Fully connect 10.
Softmax
TABLE I: The architectures of the two models.
B. Validation Coverage
In this section, we evaluate the validation coverage of the
proposed functional test generation method.
1) Validation Coverage of Different Image Sets: Fig. 2
shows the validation coverage of three different image sets:
the first one is the noisy images of Gaussian distribution;
the second is the ImageNet that is the largest data set in the
image recognition area [1]; the third is the training set of
the corresponding model. For each image set, we randomly
select 1000 images and calculate their average validation
coverage.
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Fig. 2: Validation coverage of different image sets.
We can see that the training samples achieve the highest
validation coverage for both the MNIST and CIFAR-10
model with 46% and 36%, respectively. And the ImageNet
achieves the second best performance, while random images
achieve the worst, where the validation coverage is only
13% for the MNIST and 12% for the CIFAR-10. The
results correspond to our analysis that DNNs will take full
advantage of their resources (e.g., parameters) to finish the
classification task on training samples. As a result, images
from the training set will have a higher probability to
activate more parameters than others. Noisy images have
little features similar to the training samples and thus activate
the least number of parameters.
2) Validation Coverage of Different Methods: Fig. 3
shows the validation coverage of the proposed three func-
tional test generation methods for the CIFAR-10 model, in
which we can see that a small number of selected training
samples can achieve a high validation coverage, for example,
only 20 functional tests can obtain up to 82% validation
coverage. However, selecting from training samples will
become inefficient quickly. The validation coverage only
increases 4% when the number of functional tests increases
from 20 to 10000. Moreover, we find that there are about
8% of parameters always un-activated when using the whole
training set. We analyze this phenomenon that DNNs are
highly generalized models and some parameters are reserved
for samples unseen in the training set.
For gradient based functional test generation, the vali-
dation coverage keeps increasing until it achieves almost
100%. This is because it can iteratively activate the un-
activated parameters of DNNs by generating synthetic train-
ing samples for the remaining networks. However, it is not
as efficient as selecting from training samples in the early
stage, as training samples can activate more parameters than
the synthetic ones. According to Fig. 3, 10 functional tests
from the training set can activate about 78% parameters,
Fig. 3: Validation coverage of different methods on CIFAR.
while 10 tests generated based on gradient descent method
can only activate about 66%.
Therefore, selecting tests from the training set is efficient
at the early iterations, while gradient based method is
efficient in the late stages. This justifies the necessity of
our combined method which takes the advantages of both
methods. From the red line in Fig. 3, we can see that our
combined method achieves the best validation coverage and
cost tradeoff, where 30 tests can activate 92% parameters,
while 30 training samples or synthetic samples can just
activate 84% or 76%, respectively.
Moreover, to analyze the effectiveness of synthetic train-
ing samples for activating parameters, we show the real and
synthetic training samples in Fig. 4. We can see that the
generated samples do share some common features with
the training samples of the same category. For example,
the generated digit 0 in the second row has a circle in
the image which is an important feature for recognizing 0.
Thus, we can conclude that our gradient-based functional
test generation method can efficiently generate samples
containing important features for recognition and activate
parameters effectively as training samples do.
Fig. 4: training samples vs. synthetic samples of MNIST.
C. Perturbation Detection Rate
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the
proposed validation scheme considering its detection rate
under malicious and random parameter perturbations. The
malicious perturbations are generated according to the at-
tacks proposed in [5] and the random perturbations are
to add gaussian noises. We implement each kind of pa-
rameter perturbation 10000 times against the MNIST and
CIFAR-10 models, and then calculate the detection rate by
observing whether the perturbations will change the DNN
outputs of the generated functional tests. In order to justify
the necessity of considering parameter coverage instead of
neuron coverage, we compare our combined functional test
Tests with neuron coverage Proposed with parameter coverage
Number of Tests SBA GDA Random SBA GDA Random
N=10 59.0% 67.2% 58.7% 87.2% 89.4% 86.3%
N=20 67.4% 76.5% 65.9% 91.1% 92.5% 90.4%
N=30 76.3% 84.1% 74.8% 93.5% 94.7% 92.2%
N=40 82.5% 90.2% 80.2% 95.2% 96.3% 93.6%
N=50 89.1% 92.6% 84.3% 97.3% 98.1% 96.1%
TABLE II: Detection rate under different perturbations on MNIST.
Tests with neuron coverage Proposed with parameter coverage
Number of Tests SBA GDA Random SBA GDA Random
N=10 42.2% 53.1% 40.3% 81.0% 82.1% 79.6%
N=20 58.3% 67.2% 57.6% 87.2% 89.0% 86.2%
N=30 69.2% 76.5% 68.8% 92.2% 93.9% 90.8%
N=40 76.7% 84.8% 76.0% 94.5% 96.2% 93.2%
N=50 82.8% 90.7% 82.6% 95.7% 97.3% 95.2%
TABLE III: Detection rate under different perturbations on CIFAR.
generation method with the hardware testing technique that
only considers neuron coverage [11]. It should be noted that
hardware testing cannot be used in this case as users have
no access to intermediate DNN results.
Table II and III show the detection rates for MNIST and
CIFAR-10 under single bias attack (SBA), gradient descent
attack (GDA) [5] and random perturbations, respectively. We
can see that our combined test generation method achieves
87.2% and 89.0% detection rates under SBA and GDA
respectively with only 20 functional tests for the CIFAR-
10 model. Comparing with the test generation method
considering neuron coverage, it performs worse than our
combined method, achieving much lower detection rate with
the same number of functional tests. Even though all neurons
are covered by test cases, it is not necessarily to cover
all parameters. This justifies the necessity of considering
parameter coverage in our proposed solution.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a practical validation scheme for
DNN IPs without showing users model parameters. The idea
is to generate a small number of functional tests to largely
activate model parameters. Then the perturbations on them
will propagate to the outputs and be detected. Considering
the large amounts of parameters and highly non-linearity of
DNNs, it is very challenging to solve this problem. In this
work, we first propose to judiciously select test cases from
the training set and when this method becomes inefficient,
we present a gradient-based new test generation techniques.
Finally, these two methods are combined in a unified way
to achieve both advantages. Experimental results show that
our solution achieves a good trade off between validation
coverage and cost, and can effectively detect malicious and
random perturbations with a reasonable number of tests.
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